WEBERG LAW
Case Law
Family Law Cases
Below is the list of the cases published on our site.
The case “Adams v. Adams” involves a divorce proceeding between Nancy W. Adams and Nicholas C. Adams, which was heard by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The case primarily focused on the division of marital assets, particularly the valuation of the husband’s partnership interest in a hedge fund. The court found that the Probate and Family Court had made errors in the valuation methodology of the husband’s partnership interest, leading to a remand for recalculation. The court also addressed issues related to equitable distribution under Massachusetts law, emphasizing the need to consider all relevant factors, including the contributions of both parties to the marriage. The case was notable for its complex litigation history, including multiple appeals and remands, and it highlighted the challenges in valuing partnership interests in divorce proceedings. The court ultimately affirmed some parts of the trial court’s judgment while reversing others, particularly concerning the valuation of the partnership interest.
The case “Altomare v. Altomare” involves a divorce proceeding between Patricia Marie Altomare and John Nicholas Altomare. The primary issues in this case were the wife’s request to relocate with their children within Massachusetts and the division of marital assets. Patricia, who had primary custody, sought to move from West Boylston to Scituate, a distance of about seventy-five miles. The trial court initially denied her request, finding no significant advantage to the move. However, the Appeals Court disagreed, noting that the wife’s desire to avoid emotional distress and to seek support from friends in Scituate constituted a real advantage. The court emphasized that the quality of life of the custodial parent directly impacts the children’s welfare. Consequently, the case was remanded for further proceedings to reassess the children’s best interests. The Appeals Court upheld the equal division of marital assets, affirming the trial judge’s discretion in this matter.
In the case of Arnhold v. McLean, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with a dispute between Crystal Lee Arnhold and Daniel Ernest McLean. The case primarily revolved around a modification judgment from the Probate and Family Court, which allowed Arnhold, the mother, to relocate to Florida with their two minor children. McLean, the father, appealed this decision, arguing against the relocation and also contesting the denial of joint legal custody. The court’s decision was to affirm the judgment, thereby supporting the mother’s right to move with the children. The case highlights issues of custody and relocation within family law, emphasizing the court’s discretion in such matters.
The case “Baccanti v. Morton” involves a divorce proceeding where the division of marital assets was contested, particularly focusing on the inclusion of unvested stock options. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed whether these unvested stock options could be considered part of the marital estate. The court concluded that unvested stock options are indeed assets that may be included in the marital estate, emphasizing that the division of assets in a divorce should recognize both spouses’ contributions to the acquisition and maintenance of assets during the marriage. The court outlined that the trial judge has the discretion to decide whether an asset should be included in the marital estate, considering the reasons for which the stock options were granted, such as for past, present, or future services. The decision underscores the principle that marriage is a partnership, and both parties should be compensated for their contributions, regardless of traditional concepts of title or property.
The case of “Bak v. Bak” involves a divorce proceeding in the Probate and Family Court of Massachusetts, where the court had to address several issues, including child custody, division of marital property, and alimony. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to make a custody decision under Massachusetts law, as the children were residents of the state at the time the proceedings began. The court awarded custody of two of the three children to Sonja Bak, the mother, while the eldest child chose to stay with the father, Anthony Bak. The court also divided the marital property, awarding the wife the couple’s joint stock account but not granting her any interest in certain real estate, which was kept outside the marital partnership by mutual agreement. Additionally, the court addressed issues of fraudulent conveyance, as it found that Anthony Bak had transferred property to his mother to shield it from claims by Sonja Bak. The court’s decision on alimony was remanded for further consideration due to changes in Anthony Bak’s income. Overall, the case highlights the complexities involved in divorce proceedings, particularly when international jurisdiction and property division are at play.
The case “Bernier v. Bernier” involves a divorce dispute where the main issues revolved around the valuation of S corporations owned by the couple and the division of their assets. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed whether it was appropriate to apply a “tax affecting” method, typically used for C corporations, to value the S corporations in question. This method was challenged because it could undervalue the S corporations, especially since they were to remain as S corporations and continue to be operated by one of the parties. The court vacated the initial judgment that applied this method and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court considered the applicability of certain discounts and the issue of alimony. The wife’s equity complaint, which sought an accounting and equalization of income from the businesses, was initially dismissed but later reinstated by the court, as it found that the wife had not been given a fair opportunity to present her claims. The case highlights the complexities involved in valuing business assets during divorce proceedings and the importance of ensuring equitable treatment for both parties.
The case of Bottiggi v. Wall involves a legal dispute over the division of a military pension following a divorce. Dolores Bottiggi and Robert Wall divorced in 1976, with the final decree not addressing the division of Wall’s Navy retirement pension. In 1991, Bottiggi filed a complaint seeking a share of this pension, arguing that it should be considered part of the marital estate. The Probate Court initially dismissed her complaint on the grounds of res judicata, which prevents re-litigation of issues that have already been judged, and due to the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA), which limits the division of military pensions. However, the Appeals Court found that the res judicata defense was not properly established by Wall, as he failed to demonstrate that the pension issue was litigated in the original divorce proceedings. The court also noted that while the USFSPA restricts direct division of military pensions, it does not prevent considering such pensions as assets when dividing other marital property. Consequently, the Appeals Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine how the remaining marital property should be divided, taking into account Wall’s pension as an asset.
In the case of “Brower v. Brower,” the Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed the division of pension benefits in a divorce context. The central issue was whether a portion of the husband’s future pension benefits, which were based on his earnings after the marriage, could be included in the marital estate. The court held that, under the circumstances of this case, it was permissible to include such benefits in the marital estate. The husband had appealed the denial of his motion for clarification regarding the division of his public pension and the approval of a domestic relations order that allowed the wife to receive a percentage of his pension upon retirement. The court affirmed the judgment, emphasizing the trial court’s broad discretion in dividing marital assets, including pensions, and noted that such decisions would not be overturned unless they were plainly wrong or excessive. The case highlights the complexities involved in dividing pension benefits in divorce proceedings, particularly when considering future earnings and contributions made after the marriage.
The case of Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, involves a divorce and subsequent modification proceedings between Michael and Lynn Cavanagh. The couple, who were married for approximately twenty-one years, had three sons. During their marriage, Michael worked as a physician’s assistant, while Lynn was primarily a homemaker. The divorce judgment included a separation agreement that was merged into the judgment. The case became notable for its examination of alimony and child support calculations, particularly when both are requested simultaneously. The court criticized the trial judge for not conducting a detailed analysis of the family’s circumstances as required by law before denying alimony. The decision also provided guidance on the types of income to be included in child support calculations, such as employer contributions to retirement plans and interest income. Additionally, the court addressed the interpretation of ambiguous provisions in separation agreements and emphasized the importance of including the divorce judgment in the record for appellate review. The case highlights the complexities of family law, particularly in the context of financial support and the interpretation of separation agreements.
In the case of Chaar v. Chehab, the Massachusetts Appeals Court dealt with a custody dispute involving a Lebanese court order. Nazih Mohamad El Chaar, the father, sought to enforce a Lebanese court’s custody decision in Massachusetts, which had suspended the mother’s custody rights because she had moved to Massachusetts with their child without his consent. The Massachusetts Probate Court dismissed the father’s complaint, as he failed to demonstrate that the Lebanese court’s decision was in substantial conformity with Massachusetts law, particularly regarding the best interests of the child. The court emphasized that for a foreign custody order to be recognized, it must align with Massachusetts standards, which prioritize the child’s best interests. The father’s expert on Lebanese law was not qualified by the court, as his experience was primarily in mediation rather than legal proceedings. The Appeals Court affirmed the dismissal, underscoring the importance of substantial conformity with local laws in international custody cases.
In the case of Chin v. Merriot, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the issue of whether the provisions of the Alimony Reform Act of 2011 could be applied retroactively to modify an alimony obligation that was established in a separation agreement prior to the enactment of the Act. Chester Chin and Edith Merriot were divorced in 2011, and their separation agreement included a provision for Chin to pay alimony to Merriot. Chin later sought to terminate his alimony obligation, citing his attainment of full retirement age and Merriot’s cohabitation with another person as grounds for modification under the new Act. However, the court held that the retirement and cohabitation provisions of the Alimony Reform Act apply prospectively and do not affect alimony judgments entered before the Act’s effective date. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of Chin’s complaint for modification, as he failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances under the standards that existed prior to the Act. The decision emphasized that the Act’s provisions for termination of alimony based on retirement or cohabitation do not apply retroactively to judgments that predate the Act.
In the case of “Chiu v. Lianxiang Fu,” Sam Chiu, the former husband, appealed a divorce judgment issued by the Probate and Family Court. The appeal focused on several key issues: the alleged assets of his former wife, Lianxiang Fu, the division of their marital assets, and the decision not to award him alimony. The Appeals Court vacated the portions of the judgment related to property division and alimony, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. The case involved complex issues of asset ownership, including disputed claims about assets in China and the wife’s involvement in a family business. The court’s decision highlighted the importance of evidence and credibility in determining asset division and alimony awards.
In the case of Connor v. Benedict, the wife filed for divorce in the Middlesex County Probate and Family Court after a marriage of just over two years, although the couple had lived together for much of the preceding twelve years. The court ordered the husband to pay alimony for a period of 5.148 years and divided the marital estate, awarding 55% to the husband and 45% to the wife. The judge also assigned some of the wife’s post-separation liabilities to the husband. The husband appealed, arguing against the alimony duration and the division of assets. He claimed that the wife could not have formed an economic marital partnership with him during a six-year period before their marriage because she was receiving alimony from a former spouse. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case and ultimately affirmed the judgment, finding that the judge did not err in considering the six-year period as part of the marriage duration for alimony purposes.
The case of D.L. v. G.L. revolves around the division of marital assets during a divorce proceeding. The primary issue was whether the husband’s interest in seven trusts, valued at over $100 million, should be included in the marital estate for division under Massachusetts law. The wife argued that these trusts should be considered part of the marital assets, while the husband contended otherwise. The Probate and Family Court ultimately decided to exclude the trusts from the marital estate. The wife also challenged the allocation of businesses and the sufficiency of alimony and child support awarded to her. The husband cross-appealed, raising concerns about the tax implications of the judgments. The court affirmed the decisions, except for the durational limitation on the alimony award. The case highlights the complexities involved in dividing substantial trust interests in divorce proceedings.
In the case of “De Cicco v. Barker,” the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealt with a dispute over an engagement ring. The case arose when the woman broke off the engagement without adequate cause or fault on the man’s part. The court ruled that the man was entitled to have the engagement ring returned to him. This decision was based on the understanding that the ring was given on the implied condition that the couple would marry. The court’s decision was not hindered by the Massachusetts statute G. L. c. 207, § 47A, which was enacted in 1938. This case highlights the legal principle that engagement rings are conditional gifts, contingent upon the marriage taking place. If the engagement is broken without fault by the giver, the ring should be returned.
The case “Doe v. Doe” involves a complex series of legal proceedings concerning child custody and the rights of parents. The Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed issues related to the custody of a minor child, despite conflicts between the parents and the mother’s homosexual relationship. The court found that the conflict between the parents did not affect the child’s upbringing and that the child had not suffered adverse effects from the mother’s relationship. The court upheld joint custody, emphasizing that a parent’s lifestyle alone is not sufficient grounds to sever the natural bond between a parent and a child. Additionally, the case touched on the division of marital assets, where the court awarded the marital residence to the husband with a structured payment plan to the wife. The decision was within the court’s discretion, although the rationale for certain financial decisions required further clarification. This case highlights the court’s focus on the best interests of the child and the careful consideration of parental rights and responsibilities.
In the case of Drapek v. Drapek, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the issue of whether a professional degree and the resulting increase in earning capacity acquired during a marriage could be considered part of a spouse’s estate for division in a divorce. The court ruled that while the husband’s medical degree and enhanced earning capacity could be considered when determining alimony and asset division, they were not themselves divisible assets under Massachusetts law. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the alimony award and asset assignment, as the trial judge had incorrectly treated the degree and earning capacity as part of the husband’s estate.
In the case of Duff-Kareores v. Kareores, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the calculation of the length of marriage for alimony purposes. Ellen Duff-Kareores and Christopher Kareores were initially married in 1995, divorced in 2004, cohabitated, remarried in 2012, and divorced again in 2013. The court examined whether the period of cohabitation between their marriages should be included in calculating the length of the marriage for alimony duration. The court concluded that the period of cohabitation where the parties maintained an economic marital partnership should be included, but the time between the first divorce and the start of cohabitation should not. The case was remanded for further proceedings to reassess the alimony award based on the revised length of the marriage.
In the case of “Fox v. Clift,” the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with a divorce proceeding where Peter D. Clift initiated divorce proceedings in Louisiana, while Chryseis O. Fox filed for divorce in Massachusetts. Clift did not participate in the Massachusetts proceedings, leading to a judgment that awarded Fox a significant portion of the marital estate, alimony, and attorney’s fees. Clift appealed, arguing that the Massachusetts proceedings should have been stayed due to the earlier Louisiana filing and that the financial awards were excessive. The court affirmed the judgment, emphasizing the equitable distribution of assets and the appropriateness of the financial awards.
In the case of “Freedman v. Freedman,” the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with a divorce action involving Roger A. Freedman and Ippolita S. Freedman. The couple had a child and the court was tasked with determining custody arrangements. The trial court ordered a unique custody arrangement where the child would alternate living with each parent annually. This decision was challenged on appeal, but the Appeals Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding that the arrangement was not an abuse of discretion. The court emphasized that the trial judge had carefully considered the circumstances and the best interests of the child. Additionally, the case involved issues of alimony and division of property, which were also upheld by the Appeals Court.
The case “Gallup v. Gallup” involves Everita Bray Gallup filing a petition for separate maintenance against her husband, Burton Augustus Gallup, in the Probate Court for Hampden County. The court found that Everita was living apart from her husband for justifiable reasons and granted her custody of their minor child, Mary Erminia Gallup, while ordering Burton to make support payments. Burton had previously filed for divorce in Nevada, which Everita did not contest, resulting in a default divorce decree. However, the Massachusetts court maintained jurisdiction over the custody and support matters. The court prohibited the removal of the child from the Commonwealth, and Everita’s appeal against this decision was dismissed, affirming the court’s decree.
In the case of “Glick v. Greenleaf,” the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed whether the Probate Court had jurisdiction over a case involving a separation agreement incorporated into a divorce judgment. The plaintiff, Linda Greenleaf Glick, brought an action against her father, Richard S. Greenleaf, to enforce the provisions of the separation agreement. The agreement required the father to name his ex-wife and children as beneficiaries of his retirement plan, but he failed to do so, opting instead to purchase an annuity. The Probate Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her a portion of the annuity. The Appeals Court initially reversed this decision, but the Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review and affirmed the Probate Court’s judgment, confirming its jurisdiction over the matter.
The case “Gottsegen v. Gottsegen” involves a divorce proceeding where Sandra L. Gottsegen filed for divorce from Robert S. Gottsegen, citing an irretrievable breakdown of their marriage. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case, focusing on the enforceability of an anti-cohabitation clause in their separation agreement. The court determined that the clause was unenforceable because it was part of provisions that had merged into the divorce judgment, which did not fall within the statutory authority to award alimony based on the parties’ economic situations. The court ordered the clause to be removed from the judgment and upheld the dismissal of Sandra’s motion for relief from judgment due to untimeliness. The case highlights the limitations of court authority in modifying divorce agreements and the importance of statutory compliance in alimony awards.
In the case of Grindlinger v. Grindlinger, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with a separation agreement between Gene A. Grindlinger and Michele S. Grindlinger. The couple entered into this agreement on the eve of their divorce trial, and it was incorporated into their divorce judgment. Gene Grindlinger later sought relief from the judgment, claiming he was overwhelmed with fatigue and anxiety when he signed the agreement. However, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying his motion for relief, emphasizing the finality of the agreement despite his claims of distress.
In the case of Haas v. Puchalski, Michele Puchalski Haas filed for divorce from Raymond J. Puchalski, Jr. in the Probate Court of Franklin County, Massachusetts. The divorce was granted on the grounds of cruel and abusive treatment, and Michele was awarded custody of their son, Joshua, with visitation rights for Raymond. The court prohibited Michele from removing Joshua from the Commonwealth without Raymond’s consent. Later, Raymond sought to modify the custody arrangement, arguing that Michele’s removal of Joshua from the state without his consent constituted a change in circumstances. However, the court found that Michele’s actions did not warrant a change in custody, and the original custody arrangement was upheld.
In the case of Harrington v. Harrington, Dierdre K. Harrington, the former wife of Robert M. Harrington, appealed from contempt judgments issued by a judge of the Probate and Family Court. The couple had executed a separation agreement in 1992, which was incorporated into their divorce judgment. This agreement stipulated that they would jointly own their former marital home, with Dierdre having exclusive use and occupancy. She was responsible for the mortgage, taxes, insurance, and repairs up to $500, while repairs exceeding that amount were to be shared equally. The arrangement was to continue until their last child was emancipated, at which point the property would be sold, and the proceeds divided equally. The Appeals Court affirmed the contempt judgments against Dierdre.
In the case of Heins v. Ledis, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed issues related to alimony and the division of marital property in divorce proceedings. Cheryl Heins filed for divorce from Alan Ledis, and the Probate and Family Court initially awarded her alimony partly to reimburse her for investments in her husband’s business. However, the court did not adequately assess her financial need or potential earning capacity. The Supreme Judicial Court emphasized the importance of distinguishing between alimony, which is based on financial need, and property division, which considers the joint contributions of spouses. The case was remanded for further consideration of the alimony award, highlighting the necessity of clear findings to support such decisions.
In the case of Hernandez v. Branciforte, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with a dispute arising from a divorce judgment. Adrian Hernandez and Suzanne Branciforte, who had previously entered into a separation agreement, faced issues regarding the custody and visitation of their son, Maximillian, after the mother sought to relocate permanently to Italy with him. The court had to consider the implications of the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. The judgment affirmed that the mother’s removal of the child from Massachusetts without the father’s consent was insufficient to warrant a modification of the custody order. The court emphasized that such a decision must be based on more than just the relocation itself.
In the case of “Holmes v. Holmes,” the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed issues related to alimony during divorce proceedings. Elaine Holmes filed for divorce from Kenneth Holmes, and the court initially ordered Kenneth to pay temporary alimony and child support. The final divorce judgment required Kenneth to pay a combined amount of alimony and child support weekly. Elaine later sought an increase in alimony due to her health issues and loss of employment, while Kenneth sought a reduction in child support as one of their children had moved in with him. The court examined whether the duration of temporary alimony should be included in calculating the maximum presumptive duration of general term alimony. It concluded that the calculation should start from the issuance of the divorce judgment and not include the period of temporary alimony. The court also noted that judges have discretion to deviate from the presumptive maximum term if temporary alimony was paid for an unusually long time or if there was an attempt to prolong payment unfairly.
In the case of Jian Jiang v. Qilun Liu, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with a dispute arising from a divorce judgment. Jian Jiang, the father, filed for divorce against Qilun Liu, the mother, in 2017. The court awarded the mother sole legal custody of their minor child, with the child primarily residing with her, while the father was granted extensive parenting time. The judgment also allowed each parent to travel internationally with the child once every two years during their scheduled vacation time. In 2021, the mother sought to modify the judgment to allow her to travel to China with the child for one year, which the father opposed. After a trial, the court declined to modify the travel provisions, affirming the original judgment. The court emphasized that any removal of the child from the Commonwealth must be in the child’s best interests, as per Massachusetts law.
In the case of “Johnson v. Settino,” Bruce Johnson sought the return of an engagement ring and wedding bands after ending his engagement to Caroline Settino. The couple had planned to marry in September 2018, but the relationship deteriorated due to Johnson’s suspicions of Settino’s fidelity, which were later found to be unfounded. Johnson had been financially generous, paying for gifts and part of Settino’s dental surgery. After the breakup, Settino retained the jewelry, and Johnson filed a lawsuit for their return. The trial court initially ruled in favor of Settino, applying a fault-based analysis, but the Appeals Court reversed this decision, stating that fault should not determine the outcome. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ultimately adopted a no-fault approach, ruling that engagement rings are conditional gifts given with the expectation of marriage. Consequently, the court ordered Settino to return the engagement ring and wedding band to Johnson, and remanded the case for recalculation of prejudgment interest related to Settino’s dental procedure costs.
The Kennedy v. Kennedy case is a complex and lengthy legal battle that spans multiple court decisions over several years. Initially, Lillian Frances Kennedy filed a petition for separate support in Massachusetts, while George Day Kennedy filed for divorce in Arizona. The Massachusetts court found the Arizona divorce invalid due to jurisdictional issues, as George did not meet Arizona’s residency requirements. Over the years, the case involved multiple appeals and decisions regarding contempt, modification of support orders, and counsel fees. The courts addressed issues such as the validity of foreign decrees, jurisdiction, and the modification of arrearages. The case highlights the challenges of enforcing support orders and the discretion of trial courts in awarding counsel fees. Ultimately, the courts emphasized the importance of demonstrating a material change in circumstances for modifying support orders and the need for fair enforcement of arrearages.
In the case of “Kivi v. Kivi,” the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reviewed a divorce judgment and a complaint for civil contempt. The court affirmed the judgment of divorce nisi and the judgment on the complaint for civil contempt. The decision was issued as a summary decision under M.A.C. Rule 23.0, which means it is primarily directed to the parties involved and may not fully address all the facts or the panel’s rationale. Such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. They can be cited for persuasive value but are not binding precedent.
In the case of Kowalska-Davis v. Davis, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reviewed a divorce judgment between Hanna Ewa Kowalska-Davis and Randall Lyndon Davis. The court’s decision, entered on February 27, 2012, affirmed the second amended judgment of divorce nisi. This case was decided under Rule 1:28, which means it was primarily addressed to the parties involved and may not fully elaborate on the facts or the court’s rationale. Such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. While these decisions can be cited for their persuasive value, they are not considered binding precedent.
In the case of Kuban v. Kuban, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with the division of pension benefits following a divorce. The primary issue was whether the wife had a claim to the husband’s retirement annuities contributions made by his employer after their marriage was effectively dissolved. The court affirmed the judgment that the marital property, including pension benefits, should be divided equally. However, the delay in finalizing the division due to multiple appeals led to the wife’s claim for a share of the pension benefits accrued post-divorce. The court concluded that contributions made after the dissolution of the marriage were akin to property interests acquired post-divorce and were not subject to division as marital assets.
The case “Larson v. Larson” involves a series of legal disputes between Tyler K. Larson and Amy Larson, primarily concerning the interpretation and enforcement of a marital separation agreement. The case has been revisited multiple times, each addressing different legal issues. Initially, the dispute centered on whether the youngest child was emancipated, affecting the father’s obligation to pay child support. The court ruled that the child was still dependent on the mother, thus requiring continued support. In subsequent proceedings, the focus shifted to the modification of alimony provisions. The court found that the husband violated the duty of good faith by retiring early, which affected his alimony obligations. The court upheld the modification of the alimony agreement, emphasizing the importance of good faith in marital agreements. Throughout the case, the court addressed various legal doctrines, including issue preclusion, claim preclusion, and judicial estoppel, ultimately affirming the judgments against the former husband.
In the case of “Lascom v. Lascom,” the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reviewed an amended judgment of modification dated December 7, 2022, which was affirmed. The case involved Victoria Elizabeth Lascom and Matthew William Lascom. The decision was issued as a summary decision under M.A.C. Rule 23.0, which means it is primarily directed to the parties involved and may not fully address all the facts or the panel’s rationale. Such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. While these decisions can be cited for their persuasive value, they are not considered binding precedent. The judgment was affirmed by Judges Ditkoff, Singh, and Hodgens.
In the case of Lyman v. Lanser, the Massachusetts Appeals Court dealt with the enforceability of an oral agreement between Brent Lyman and Sasha Lanser regarding the shared possession of their jointly owned Pomeranian dog, Teddy Bear. After their separation, the couple initially alternated possession of the dog weekly. However, Lanser later refused to allow Lyman access to Teddy Bear, prompting Lyman to seek legal action for conversion and breach of contract. He sought equitable relief, specifically the enforcement of their oral agreement to share possession of the dog. The Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction to enforce this arrangement, recognizing the joint ownership and clear agreement. Although a single justice of the Appeals Court vacated the injunction, citing Massachusetts law’s lack of recognition for “shared custody” of pets, the Appeals Court ultimately reversed this decision. The court reinstated the injunction based on property and contract law principles, emphasizing the unique nature of pets as personal property and the inadequacy of monetary damages to compensate for the loss of companionship.
In the case of “MacKenzie v. Gauger,” Cynthia B. MacKenzie and Ann C. Gauger were in a committed relationship starting in 1992, married in 2004, and divorced in 2021. MacKenzie appealed the divorce judgment, contesting the division of her pension. The court affirmed the judgment, noting that the judge had considered relevant factors, including the couple’s long-term relationship and MacKenzie’s intent to provide pension benefits to Gauger. The judge’s decision to include MacKenzie’s entire pension in the marital estate was deemed neither plainly wrong nor excessive. The court also addressed MacKenzie’s argument regarding the financial support she provided to Gauger before marriage, concluding that the judge had appropriately considered these circumstances.
In the case of Mahoney v. Mahoney, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with a dispute arising from a divorce agreement. Christopher A. Mahoney filed a complaint for civil contempt against Shirley A. Mahoney, alleging she failed to comply with a section of their separation agreement. This section required Shirley to buy out Christopher’s fifty percent interest in their marital home by refinancing by a specific date. Shirley argued that she had already purchased the house from Christopher, providing a quitclaim deed and a canceled check as evidence. The court initially held Shirley in contempt for not complying with the order regarding the marital home. However, Shirley appealed, claiming she was denied an evidentiary hearing and that her motion to dismiss the contempt complaint should have been granted. The Appeals Court vacated the judgment of contempt and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss.
In the case of Mason v. Coleman, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealt with a custody dispute where both parents shared legal and physical custody of their children. The mother sought to relocate with the children to New Hampshire, but the father obtained an injunction to prevent the move. The court distinguished this case from others where one parent has sole custody, emphasizing that in joint custody situations, the interest of one parent in relocating is often diminished. The court reviewed factors such as the quality of schools, the impact of uprooting the children, and the lack of clear benefits to the mother from the move. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial judge’s decision that the relocation was not in the children’s best interests.
The case “Miller v. Miller” involves a dispute over the removal of a child from Massachusetts to Germany following the parents’ separation. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the standards applicable when a parent seeks to relocate a child without a formal custody order in place. The court emphasized the importance of determining whether the parenting arrangement more closely resembles sole or shared custody. This determination guides whether the “real advantage” standard or the “best interests” standard should be applied. The court ultimately upheld the trial judge’s decision, which found that the mother was the primary caregiver and that relocating the child to Germany was in the child’s best interest. The decision highlighted the significance of the child’s quality of life and the mother’s improved circumstances in Germany.
The case “Murphy v. Murphy” involves a divorce proceeding where the Appeals Court of Massachusetts upheld the Probate and Family Court’s decision to grant joint legal custody of the couple’s daughter to both parents, while awarding sole physical custody to the wife. The court also permitted the wife to relocate with the daughter to New York, applying the “real advantage” standard from the Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas case. This standard was deemed appropriate as the wife was considered the primary caretaker, despite a temporary shared custody arrangement. The court found that the move provided a real advantage to the wife, who had family support and job opportunities in New York, and concluded that the relocation was in the best interests of the child. The court also addressed financial matters, including attorney fees and uninsured medical expenses, modifying some aspects of the original judgment.
In the case of “Murray v. Super,” the Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed a dispute involving a mother’s request to relocate her children from Massachusetts to California following a divorce. The mother, who had primary custody, argued that the move would provide her with significant personal advantages, which she believed would benefit the children as well. However, the court found that the proposed relocation would have substantial negative impacts on the children and their relationship with their father, outweighing any benefits to the mother. The court emphasized the importance of the children’s best interests and the father’s rights, ultimately denying the mother’s request. Additionally, the court remanded the case for further findings on the father’s child support obligations, particularly concerning the financial contributions from the mother’s new husband.
In the case of Oakes v. Bilden-Oakes, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reviewed a divorce judgment where Shelly Bilden-Oakes appealed the denial of her request for alimony. The court found that the trial judge had incorrectly determined that Chad Oakes was unable to pay alimony and that there was insufficient evidence regarding the couple’s marital lifestyle to assess the appropriate alimony amount. Consequently, the Appeals Court vacated the portion of the divorce judgment related to alimony and remanded the case for further proceedings to address these issues.
In the case of Paltis v. Paltis, Stanislav Paltis appealed a divorce judgment concerning the division of property with his former spouse, Regina Paltis. The couple, married in 2010, had one child. Stanislav was the primary wage earner, while Regina managed the household and child-rearing. During their marriage, they lived in a property owned by Stanislav before their marriage, which Regina improved with her design skills. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the original judgment, maintaining the property division as decided by the lower court.
In the case of “Partridge v. Partridge,” the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with a divorce proceeding where the wife challenged the trial court’s orders regarding alimony and the division of marital assets. The court found that the trial court’s decisions were not supported by comprehensive findings. The trial court had focused excessively on the moral conduct of the parties rather than on critical factors such as the wife’s needs, the husband’s ability to pay, and the financial circumstances of both parties. Consequently, the case was remanded for a retrial with instructions to issue detailed findings to support any alimony award and asset division.
The case “Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl” involves a divorce dispute where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had to determine whether the husband’s interest in a discretionary spendthrift trust could be considered part of the marital estate for division purposes. Initially, the Probate and Family Court included the trust in the marital estate, awarding the wife a portion of its value. However, the Supreme Judicial Court overturned this decision, ruling that the husband’s interest was too speculative and akin to a mere expectancy, thus not subject to division as a marital asset. The court did allow for the consideration of this expectancy in evaluating each spouse’s future opportunities for acquiring assets and income.
In the case of Pierce v. Pierce, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the issue of alimony modification following the retirement of Rudolph F. Pierce. Rudolph and Carneice G. Pierce were married for thirty-two years before divorcing in 1999. Their separation agreement required Rudolph to pay alimony to Carneice, which would terminate upon the death of either party or Carneice’s remarriage. In 2008, Rudolph retired and sought to terminate his alimony obligation, arguing that his retirement constituted a material change in circumstances. The court, however, ruled that retirement alone did not automatically justify the termination of alimony. Instead, the court emphasized the need to consider all statutory factors, such as the length of the marriage, the parties’ financial situations, and their future earning capacities. The court ultimately reduced Rudolph’s alimony obligation but did not terminate it, highlighting the importance of balancing the financial sacrifices of both parties.
In the case of R.B. v. C.C., the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reviewed a judgment of divorce nisi issued by the Probate and Family Court. The case involved a dispute between R.B. (the husband) and C.C. (the wife) regarding the division of property following their divorce. C.C., the former spouse, appealed the judgment, challenging various aspects of the property division. The Appeals Court, however, affirmed the judgment and the supplemental judgment, indicating that the original decision by the Probate and Family Court was upheld. The decision was issued as a summary decision under M.A.C. Rule 23.0, which means it is primarily directed to the parties involved and may not fully address all the facts or the panel’s decisional rationale. Such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. They may be cited for their persuasive value but not as binding precedent.
The case “R.H. v. B.F.” was heard by the Appeals Court of Massachusetts and involved issues of child custody, abuse prevention, and the application of battered woman syndrome. The case originated in the Nantucket Division of the Probate and Family Court, where the mother, represented by Carol A. Witt, and the father, represented by Wayne F. Holmes, contested custody matters. The court considered the implications of abuse and the psychological impact on the mother, ultimately making a decision based on the best interests of the child. The case highlights the complexities involved in custody disputes where allegations of abuse are present and the role of the Probate Court in making determinations that prioritize child welfare.
In the case of Rice v. Rice, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealt with the division of property and alimony in a divorce proceeding. Nancy Ann K. Rice sought a divorce from John H. Rice, which was granted by the Probate Court. The court awarded Nancy approximately half of John’s estate and $30,000 annually in alimony. John appealed the decision, arguing that the division of property was excessive. The court, however, upheld the judgment, emphasizing the broad discretion granted to probate judges under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. 208, § 34. The judge considered various factors, including Nancy’s lack of vocational skills and her responsibilities as a custodial parent, in making the decision. The court found that the division was equitable, given the circumstances, and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
In the case of Rodman v. Rodman, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the issue of whether the retirement provisions of the Alimony Reform Act could be applied retroactively to modify an alimony agreement that was part of a divorce judgment entered before March 1, 2012. George J. Rodman sought to terminate his alimony obligations to his former wife, Roberta Rodman, upon reaching full retirement age, as defined by the Alimony Reform Act. The court concluded that the retirement provisions did not apply retroactively to modify the alimony agreement, as the agreement had merged into the divorce judgment prior to the effective date of the Act. The court emphasized that the legislative intent was not to allow retroactive application of the retirement provisions to merged agreements.
In the case of Rosenthal v. Maney, the mother, Amy P. Rawstron Rosenthal, sought to relocate with her child to Rhode Island, where she worked and her new husband resided. The father, Paul S. Maney, opposed the move, arguing it was not in the child’s best interest and sought custody modification. The trial court denied the mother’s request and transferred custody to the father. However, the Appeals Court reversed this decision, emphasizing that the father’s request for custody modification must be based on a substantial change in circumstances unrelated to the move. The court highlighted that the mother had a sincere reason for relocating, which provided a real advantage. The court also outlined factors to consider in determining the child’s best interests, including the child’s quality of life improvement, the impact on the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent, and the child’s emotional and developmental needs.
In the case of S.L. v. R.L., the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with issues related to the division of marital assets and alimony in a divorce proceeding. The wife, S.L., contested the inclusion of her interests in certain trusts as part of the marital estate and the amount of alimony awarded by the trial judge. The court determined that one of the five trusts should not have been included in the marital estate, while the other four trusts were appropriately included. The court also upheld the trial judge’s decision to use the “if and when received” method for distributing the wife’s interest in those trusts. Additionally, the court found that the alimony awarded was within the judge’s discretion.
In the case of “S.S. v. S.S.,” the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reviewed a decision from the Probate and Family Court regarding a divorce judgment. The original judgment required the husband to pay alimony to the wife potentially for the rest of her life, deviating from the standard durational limits set by Massachusetts law. The wife argued that her mental health condition and inability to work justified this deviation. However, the Appeals Court found that she did not sufficiently prove that her condition would persist beyond the typical termination date for alimony. Consequently, the Appeals Court reversed this part of the judgment. The husband also contested the amount of alimony, child support, and the division of assets, but the Appeals Court upheld these aspects of the judgment, affirming the lower court’s discretion in these matters.
In the case of Schuler v. Schuler, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealt with a husband’s request to modify his alimony and child support obligations following a significant reduction in his income due to job loss. Despite this reduction, the court found that the husband still had the ability to meet his financial obligations as outlined in the original divorce judgment. The court considered not only the husband’s actual income but also his potential earning capacity and assets. The husband’s expenses related to his second family were not deemed relevant, as he was still found capable of fulfilling his obligations to his first family. The court emphasized the importance of demonstrating a material change in circumstances to justify modifying support obligations.
In the case of Scuteri v. Shuman, Jeffrey T. Scuteri, Jr. filed a lawsuit against Maria-Pia Shuman and Mischa Haider, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violations of state privacy and wiretapping statutes. The conflict began when Shuman informed Scuteri that she was pregnant and claimed he was the father, despite being married to a woman and having no sexual relations with other men. Scuteri, suspecting deceit, hired a private investigator and later discovered he was not the father after a paternity test. The defendants allegedly attempted to blackmail Scuteri with a video of him and Shuman, leading to further legal action. The defendants were defaulted for failing to attend depositions, and a default judgment was entered against them. The court found no abuse of discretion in the default orders and affirmed the judgment, rejecting the defendants’ arguments regarding discovery sanctions and statute of limitations.
In the case of “Smith v. Smith,” the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with issues surrounding post-divorce agreements related to alimony. The husband and wife had reached several agreements without court approval that reduced the alimony amount initially ordered by the court. The husband relied on these reductions to take on additional financial responsibilities for their emancipated children, such as paying for graduate school tuition and a wedding. The wife later filed a complaint for contempt, seeking the arrearage owed under the original court-approved alimony agreement. The court found that the husband was not in contempt, as the wife had agreed to the reductions, and the husband had acted in reliance on these agreements. The court emphasized that the husband did not act in clear disobedience of the divorce judgment.
In the case of Talvitie v. Talvitie, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reviewed a judgment from the Probate and Family Court regarding a complaint for contempt filed by Barbara Clark against her former spouse, Kristian P. Talvitie. The court ordered Kristian to pay $573,052 in alimony, despite not finding him in contempt. The dispute centered on the interpretation of the separation agreement, which required Kristian to pay a percentage of his earned income as alimony. The court affirmed the judgment, disagreeing with Kristian’s claim that the interpretation was incorrect.
In the case of “Smith v. Smith,” the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with issues surrounding post-divorce agreements related to alimony. The husband and wife had reached several agreements without court approval that reduced the alimony amount initially ordered by the court. The husband relied on these reductions to take on additional financial responsibilities for their emancipated children, such as paying for graduate school tuition and a wedding. The wife later filed a complaint for contempt, seeking the arrearage owed under the original court-approved alimony agreement. The court found that the husband was not in contempt, as the wife had agreed to the reductions, and the husband had acted in reliance on these agreements. The court emphasized that the husband did not act in clear disobedience of the divorce judgment.
In the case of Tanner v. Tanner, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with an appeal from George Donald Tanner regarding a Probate Court judgment. The judgment involved the division and distribution of marital property following divorce complaints from both parties. The primary issue on appeal was the requirement for George to convey his interest in the family home, valued at $70,000, to Carlynn Louise Tanner in exchange for $15,000. George argued that the apportionment was not supported by the facts or evidence and that the judge failed to provide a rationale for the decision. He also claimed that the judge considered factors outside the scope of the relevant statute, G. L. c. 208, § 34. However, the Appeals Court found no error in the Probate Court’s decision and affirmed the judgments, indicating that the division of assets was within the court’s discretion and supported by the evidence.
In the case of “Turek v. Wallace,” the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with a dispute between Daniel Turek and Jennifer Wallace. The case was entered on May 8, 2024, and is documented under 2024 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 284. The court’s decision was issued as a summary decision under M.A.C. Rule 23.0, which means it primarily addressed the parties involved and may not fully elaborate on the facts or the panel’s reasoning. The judgment was affirmed, and the case was not circulated to the entire court, representing only the views of the panel that decided it. The decision can be cited for its persuasive value but not as binding precedent. The appeal was later denied by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
In the case of Vassiliou v. Vassiliou, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reviewed a divorce proceeding involving Stacey L. Vassiliou and Dean J. Vassiliou. The court addressed issues related to custody, the wife’s request to relocate the children to Greece, and the division of property. The couple, originally from Greece, had established their lives in the United States, where their children were born. The trial judge made detailed findings of fact, considering the impact of the move on the children and the benefits to the wife, who had better professional opportunities in Greece. The court granted joint legal custody to both parents, with the wife having physical custody and permission to move the children to Greece. The husband was granted visitation rights, and the costs of transportation were to be shared. The court also ruled on alimony and property division, affirming the trial judge’s decisions on all counts.
The case “Williams v. Massa” involves divorce proceedings between Donna J. Williams and Donald P. Massa. The wife appealed the amended judgment of divorce, challenging the distribution of inherited and gifted assets, the property division, alimony, child support, attorney’s fees, and custody arrangements. The court affirmed the property division, alimony, child support, and attorney’s fees, but modified the custody order to require any future changes to be made through a complaint for modification rather than a motion. The court emphasized the importance of considering both economic and noneconomic contributions to the marital partnership in equitable distribution. Contingent remainder interests in trusts were deemed expectancies and excluded from the marital estate.
In the case of Williams v. Pitney, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealt with a dispute arising from a divorce judgment. The case involved Georgia Williams, who sought to relocate with her two minor children to California, despite a separation agreement with John H. Stevens Pitney that prohibited removing the children from Massachusetts without mutual consent. The separation agreement was part of the divorce judgment and was intended to survive it. The court was tasked with determining the burden of proof required for a party to be granted permission to relocate under General Laws chapter 208, section 30. The court ultimately affirmed the judgment, allowing the relocation.
In the case of Woodside v. Woodside, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts dealt with a divorce proceeding involving C. Michael Woodside and Sharry A. Woodside. The couple divorced after fifteen years of marriage, and the court initially issued a bifurcated judgment of divorce nisi, which incorporated their agreement on custody and visitation of their two children. The agreement granted joint legal custody, with the children primarily residing with the wife. The wife later sought to move the children to Maine, which led to a trial addressing this removal request along with issues of asset division and support. The court allowed the removal, applying the “real advantage test” from Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, as the wife was deemed the primary caretaker. The husband appealed, arguing the test was misapplied since neither party had sole physical custody. The Appeals Court upheld the trial court’s decision, affirming the application of the Yannas standard and the award of alimony, as the court had conducted a proper factual inquiry into the custodial arrangement.
The case “Wooters v. Wooters” involves a divorce judgment where Thomas A. Wooters was ordered to pay alimony to Janet S. Wooters. The judgment specified that the alimony would be one-third of Thomas’s gross annual employment income, without deductions for various contributions and premiums. Initially, Thomas was a partner at a law firm, but later he became an executive vice president and general counsel for LoJack Corporation, where his compensation included stock options. The case addressed whether income from exercised stock options should be considered part of his gross annual income for alimony calculations. The Appeals Court concluded that stock options exercised by Thomas should be included in his income for alimony purposes. However, despite failing to pay the required alimony, Thomas was not found in contempt because his actions did not constitute clear disobedience of a clear command, as the court considered the totality of circumstances, including agreements between the parties.
In the case of Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealt with a divorce proceeding where the primary issue was the custody and potential relocation of the couple’s two minor children. The court had to decide whether the mother, who was awarded physical custody, could move the children from Massachusetts to Greece. The court applied the “real advantage” test, which considers whether the move would benefit the custodial parent and, consequently, the children. The judge found that the move would be advantageous for the mother financially, emotionally, and socially, and that it would strengthen family and cultural ties for the children. The court also ensured that reasonable visitation arrangements with the father would be maintained. Ultimately, the court affirmed the decision to allow the relocation, emphasizing the best interests of the children.